Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?

被引:79
作者
Fredriksson, Per G. [1 ]
Neumayer, Eric [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Louisville, Dept Econ, Louisville, KY 40292 USA
[2] London Sch Econ, Dept Geog & Environm, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] Grantham Inst Climate Change & Environm, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
International public goods; Climate change; Environmental policy; Democracy; Democratic capital; Executive constraints; POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS; CORRUPTION; POLLUTION; INVESTMENT; INEQUALITY; RATIFICATION; DICTATORSHIP; CONVENTION; COMMITMENT; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.08.002
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 19
页数:9
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