Ohio school milk markets: an analysis of bidding

被引:166
作者
Porter, RH [1 ]
Zona, JD
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2556080
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the institutional details of the school milk procurement process, bidding data, statements of daily executives, and supply characteristics in Ohio during the 1980s. We compare the bidding behavior of a group of firms in Cincinnati to a control group. We find that the behavior of each of the firms differs from that of the control group. We argue that the behavior of these firms is consistent with collusion. The estimated average effect of collusion on market prices is about 6.5%, or roughly the cost of shipping school milk about 50 miles.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 288
页数:26
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