Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

被引：10

作者：

Vida, Peter ^{[1
]}

Forges, Francoise ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Paris 09, F-75775 Paris 16, France

来源：

THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 8卷 / 01期

关键词：

Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; preplay communication; GAMES; INFORMATION; REPLACE;

D O I：

10.3982/TE944

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

引用

页码：95 / 123

页数：29

共 35 条

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[3]

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