Lying and knowing

被引：12
作者：
Holguin, Ben [1 ]
机构：
[1] NYU, Dept Philosophy, 5 Washington Pl, New York, NY 10003 USA
来源：
SYNTHESE | 2021年 / 198卷 / 06期
关键词：
Lying; Knowing; Belief; Assertion; Gettier cases; BALD-FACED LIES; KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNT; BELIEF; INTENT; TRUTH;
D O I：
10.1007/s11229-019-02407-2
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
引用
收藏
页码：5351 / 5371
页数：21
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