Could Emotion Development Really Be the Acquisition of Emotion Concepts?

被引：5

作者：

D'Arms, Justin ^{[1
]}

Samuels, Richard ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY | 2019年 / 55卷 / 09期

关键词：

emotion; constructionism; concept; embodiment; categorization;

D O I：

10.1037/dev0000767

中图分类号：

B844 [发展心理学（人类心理学）];

学科分类号：

040202 ;

摘要：

Emotion development research centrally concerns capacities to produce emotions and to think about them. We distinguish these enterprises and consider a novel account of how they might be related. On one recent account, the capacity to have emotions of various kinds comes by way of the acquisition of emotion concepts. This account relies on a constructionist theory of emotions and an embodied theory of emotion concepts. We explicate these elements, then raise a challenge for the approach. It appears to be incompatible with various familiar ways in which cognitions about one's own emotions can come apart from episodes of emotion.

引用

页码：2015 / 2019

页数：5

共 11 条

[1]

Barrett L. F., 2017, How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain

[2] Moving beyond the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts [J].