Research on Credit Guarantee System of SMEs Group Lending Based on Repeated Game

被引:0
作者
Pan, Yonming [1 ]
Zhu, Maodong [1 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ Thechnol, Sch Management, Tianjin 300384, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITIES SCIENCE (ETMHS 2015) | 2015年 / 27卷
关键词
Group lending; SEM; Repeated game; Creadit Guarantee;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
G40 [教育学];
学科分类号
040101 ; 120403 ;
摘要
Research on community financing is still lack of security agencies to join and the repayment situation in practice is not ideal. In this paper, repeated game theory is used as a tool to analysis the rational choice path of bank and enterprises game based on the credit guarantees added, thus maximizing the prevention and resolution of the negative effect and impact of the single credit game. Believe that Security agencies intervention can solve the problem of information asymmetry in part, enhance the efficiency of corporate financing and repayment enthusiasm. By comparing the results of the financing group game before the introduction of security agencies, proving that credit guarantee can not only promote the integration of corporate credit guarantee financing body, but also improve the behavior of the parties repayment enthusiasm.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 78
页数:4
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