Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game

Game-theoretic experiments have revealed substantial individual differences where the game allows for off-equilibrium behavior such as trust and reciprocity. We explore the personality psychology and decision making literatures and conclude that these individual differences are likely to be mediated by differential emotional arousal. We argue that Christie and Geis's Machiavellianism scale (Mach-IV) is an instrument that allows the identification of types who vary in cooperativeness. We use that test to predict the behavior of participants in a two-person one-shot constituent game in which subjects face a choice between trust and distrust, and between reciprocation (trustworthiness) and defection. We find that the Mach-IV scale does not predict trusting behavior. It does, however, predict reciprocity. Over one half of those who score low to average on the scale reciprocate trust. High scorers overwhelmingly defect when it is to their advantage to do so. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.