An empirical study of applied game theory: Transmission constrained Cournot behavior

被引：91

作者：

Cunningham, LB ^{[1
]}

Baldick, R ^{[1
]}

Baughman, ML ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS | 2002年 / 17卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

game theory; Cournot; transmission constraints; pricing of power; market models;

D O I：

10.1109/59.982209

中图分类号：

TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];

学科分类号：

0808 ; 0809 ;

摘要：

Restructured energy markets present opportunities for the exercise of market power, meaning market players can potentially maintain prices in excess of competitive prices. In this paper, we investigate Cournot equilibrium in a simple example network. We analyze three market players in a transmission-constrained system and consider nonconstant marginal cost. Several scenarios are evaluated that show a pure strategy equilibrium can break down even when a transmission constraint exceeds the value of the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium line flow.

引用

页码：166 / 172

页数：7

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