An examination of the impact of executive compensation disparity on corporate social performance

被引：32

作者：

Hart, Timothy A. ^{[1
]}

David, Parthiban ^{[2
]}

Shao, Feibo ^{[3
]}

Fox, Corey J. ^{[4
]}

Westermann-Behaylo, Michelle ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Tulsa, Collins Coll Business, Management, Tulsa, OK 74104 USA

[2] Amer Univ, Strategy, Washington, DC 20016 USA

[3] Oklahoma State Univ, Dept Management, Tulsa, OK 74106 USA

[4] Missouri State Univ, Coll Business, Management, Springfield, MO USA

[5] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam Business Sch, Int Management, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION | 2015年 / 13卷 / 03期

关键词：

Corporate social performance; equity theory; executive compensation; stakeholder management; tournament theory; PAY DISPERSION; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; RISK-TAKING; STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT; COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; CEO COMPENSATION; DECISION-MAKING; PANEL-DATA; FIRM; RESPONSIBILITY;

D O I：

10.1177/1476127015585103

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the relationship between top management team compensation disparity and corporate social performance. We argue that pay structures with high disparity are reflective of transactional, individualistic organizations that foster a shareholder orientation. In contrast, pay structures with low disparity are indicative of relational, cooperative organizations that foster a stakeholder orientation. Examining the effect of these attributes on corporate social performance, we find that corporate social performance is higher in low pay disparity firms than in high pay disparity firms. We discuss our contributions to executive compensation and corporate social performance research and suggest directions for future research.

引用

页码：200 / 223

页数：24

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