Detecting and investigating transnational corporate bribery in centralised and decentralised enforcement systems: discretion and (de-)prioritisation in the UK and Germany

This article analyses how two contrasting enforcement systems, those of the UK (centralised) and Germany (decentralised), go about detecting and investigating transnational corporate bribery and corruption. Comparing these practices in contrasting systems is a useful empirical focus as both jurisdictions inhabit similar institutional contexts for corporate bribery (e.g. relatively strong western European economies, fellow members of the EU/G8, subject to international conventions) while both are considered active enforcers' of international bribery conventions, and therefore, being sufficiently involved in policing to have modes of enforcement to analyse. More specifically, the article examines the varied processes of detection and investigation within these differing systems and goes on to analyse how discretion is applied at both stages in the (de-)prioritisation of cases. The article outlines the strengths/limitations and differences/similarities of the two systems in terms of structure and practice, demonstrating how responsible authorities implement detection and investigative practices and why certain cases are focused on. The article argues that whether centralised or decentralised, and whether guided by flexible or rigid legal frameworks, formal and informal practices of discretion lead to legal and operational tensions that result in the accommodation of bribery by state authorities.