The impacts of land fragmentation on irrigation collective action: Empirical test of the social-ecological system framework in China

被引:59
作者
Wang, Yahua [1 ,2 ]
Zang, Liangzhen [3 ]
Araral, Eduardo [4 ]
机构
[1] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Publ Policy & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[2] Tsinghua Univ, China Inst Rural Studies, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[3] Chinese Acad Agr Sci, Inst Agr Econ & Dev, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew Sch Publ Policy, Singapore, Singapore
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Land fragmentation; Social-ecological system; Commons; Collective action; China; OWNERSHIP FRAGMENTATION; COMMONS THEORY; MANAGEMENT; PARTICIPATION; RESOURCES; REFORM; GOVERNANCE; EFFICIENCY; NETWORK; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jrurstud.2020.06.005
中图分类号
P9 [自然地理学]; K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ; 070501 ;
摘要
Land fragmentation is an interesting physical character in some developing countries, especially China. This study aims to discover the direct and mediated effects of land fragmentation on collective action in China based on an empirical test and the social-ecological system framework. We introduce three innovations to the literature on collective action in the commons. First, we focus on the mechanism of land fragmentation on collective action in the commons, which has been largely ignored in the literature. Second, building on the social-ecological system framework, we use structural equation modeling, which is robust to endogeneity and latent variable problems. Third, we use original survey data from 3895 households and 284 villages from 17 provinces/regions in China, a critical case because China has some of the most fragmented farmland use in the world. We find that land fragmentation has a direct negative effect on irrigation collective action. And besides the direct negative effect, there are four indirect factors: dependency on farming, irrigation rule-making, economic pressure and land circulation. Of these, the first three have a negative effect, and the last one, a positive effect. Our findings add to the theoretical literature on collective action in the commons and suggest new policy handles for more efficient land and labor markets in China.
引用
收藏
页码:234 / 244
页数:11
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