The power of voting and corruption cycles

被引：9

作者：

Accinelli, E. ^{[1
]}

Martins, Filipe ^{[2
]}

Pinto, Alberto A. ^{[2
]}

Afsar, Atefeh ^{[2
]}

Oliveira, Bruno M. P. M. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Autonoma San Luis Potosi, Fac Econ, Av Pintores S-N, San Luis Potosi 78213, Slp, Mexico

[2] Univ Porto, Dept Math, LIAAD INESC TEC, Porto, Portugal

[3] Univ Porto, LIAAD INESC TEC, Fac Ciencias Nutr & Alimentacao, Porto, Portugal

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY | 2022年 / 46卷 / 01期

关键词：

Corruption; democracy; evolutionary game theory; replicator dynamics; heteroclinic cycles; social traps; IMPACT; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1080/0022250X.2020.1818077

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

引用

页码：56 / 79

页数：24

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