Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

被引：0
作者：
Loginova, Oksana [1 ]
Lu, Haibin [1 ]
Wang, X. Henry [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
来源：
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 9卷 / 01期
关键词：
peer-to-peer networks; file sharing incentive schemes; mechanism design; MECHANISM;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.
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页数：24
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