Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

被引：4

作者：

Balzer, Benjamin ^{[1
]}

Rosato, Antonio ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

von Wangenheim, Jonas ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] UTS Business Sch, Ultimo, Australia

[2] Univ Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

[3] Univ Napoli Federico II, Naples, Italy

[4] CSEF, Naples, Italy

[5] Univ Bonn, Bonn, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2022年 / 205卷

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

Loss aversion; Dutch auctions; Revenue equivalence; Personal equilibrium; REFERENCE-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; REFERENCE POINTS; BID AUCTIONS; RISK; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOR; EQUIVALENCE; ENDOWMENTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2022.105545

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study Dutch and first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders and show that the strategic equivalence between these formats no longer holds. Intuitively, as the Dutch auction unfolds, a bidder becomes more optimistic about her chances of winning; this stronger "attachment" effect pushes her to bid more aggressively than in the first-price auction. Thus, Dutch auctions raise more revenue than first-price ones. Indeed, the Dutch auction raises the most revenue among standard auction formats. Our results imply that dynamic mechanisms that make bidders more optimistic raise more revenue, thereby rationalizing the use of descending-price mechanisms by sellers in the field.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：32

共 70 条

[1] Reference Points and Effort Provision [J].