Fragmentation to avoid overreaction to public information: A Coordination Game Application to Central Bank Communication Strategies

被引：0

作者：

Trabelsi, Emna ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Inst Super Gest, Dept Quantitat Methods, Tunis, Tunisia

来源：

2013 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTROL, DECISION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES (CODIT) | 2013年

关键词：

Transparency; Central bank Communication; semi public information; private information; static coordination game; SOCIAL VALUE;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：943 / 950

页数：8

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