The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games

被引：8

作者：

Llerena, F ^{[1
]}

Rafels, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Barcelona, Dept Actuarial Financial & Econ Math, E-08007 Barcelona, Spain

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2006年 / 54卷 / 02期

关键词：

cooperative games; convex games; almost positive games; modular games; zero-monotonic games; lattice;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：373 / 379

页数：7

共 10 条

[1] MINIMARG AND MAXIMARG OPERATORS [J].