New-Style Campaigns in State Supreme Court Retention Elections

被引:6
作者
Hughes, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Auburn Univ, Polit Sci, Montgomery, AL 36117 USA
关键词
judicial politics; judicial elections; voting behavior; political behavior; campaigns; interest groups and elections; JUDICIAL SELECTION; PARTICIPATION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1177/1532440018807256
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Scholarly research finds that partisan, hard-fought, expensive, and churlish state supreme court campaigns increase voter participation and their support for challenger candidates. These insights, however, are drawn nearly exclusively from competitive state supreme court elections. Little is known about voter behavior in uncompetitive retention elections. Traditionally, these races are not salient to the public given that incumbents raise and spend little-to-no money, and campaigns, parties, and political action committees air few (if any) advertisements. Since 2010, however, such behavior has become more commonplace. I assess voter participation and incumbent performance in 178 state supreme court retention elections from 2002 to 2014. I find that expensive, churlish retention elections are likely to increase voter turnout and to hurt incumbents' efforts to win retention.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 154
页数:28
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