Noncooperative and Cooperative Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

被引：47

作者：

Hirose, Kosuke ^{[1
]}

Lee, Sang-Ho ^{[2
]}

Matsumura, Toshihiro ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Osaka Univ Econ, Fac Econ, Osaka, Japan

[2] Chonnam Natl Univ, Coll Business Adm, Gwangju, South Korea

[3] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2020年 / 176卷 / 03期

基金：

新加坡国家研究基金会;

关键词：

corporate social responsibility; anticompetitive effect; emission cap; emission intensity; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; STANDARDS; INCENTIVES; TAX;

D O I：

10.1628/jite-2020-0035

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition.

引用

页码：549 / 571

页数：23

共 39 条

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