Game Analysis on Cooperation in Technological Innovation between Enterprises and Scientific Research Institutes

被引：0

作者：

Guo Sandang ^{[1
]}

Liu Bin ^{[1
]}

Zhai Zhenjie ^{[1
]}

Liu Fang ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Henan Agr Univ, Coll Informat & Management Sci, Zhengzhou 450002, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOLS A-C | 2008年

关键词：

Technological Innovation; Game; Best Technological Contents;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Fixed payment or paying in proportion according to the output of production is the pattern which enterprises and scientific research institutes often take when they carry on technological innovation together. A higher technological innovation is always anticipated. In this article, the income functions and the game models of technological innovation under different patterns are constructed and a different viewpoint is gained that technological innovation has the best technological contents in every pattern, respectively, through comparing and analyzing two game models. Enterprises and scientific research institutes should have different priorities for choices in different modes.

引用

页码：1940 / 1943

页数：4

共 12 条

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