THE USE AND THREAT OF INJUNCTIONS IN THE RAND CONTEXT

被引:8
作者
Ratliff, James
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS; PATENT HOLDUP; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; ROYALTIES; SHADOW;
D O I
10.1093/joclec/nhs038
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We model a dispute between the owner of a standard-essential patent and an implementer of the standard over whether the patentee's license offer is reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND). An injunction is not ruled out, yet that threat does not lead to holdup. A key element is that the implementer always has a last-resort ability to accept license terms that are either certified by a court as RAND or mutually agreed upon by the patentee and implementer.
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页码:1 / 22
页数:22
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