The determinants of board size and independence: Evidence from China

被引:67
作者
Chen, Catherine Huirong [1 ]
Al-Najjar, Basil [1 ]
机构
[1] Middlesex Univ, Sch Business, London NW4 4BT, England
关键词
Board size; Board structure; Corporate governance; China; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; DIRECTORS; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.09.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
China's corporate governance reform offers an interesting context for investigating the determinants of board size and independence. Analysing a large panel dataset from 1999 to 2003, we find that Chinese board size is primarily driven by firm complexity; board independence is mainly driven by regulation. Some governance factors newly introduced in this study also have a significant impact. For example, board independence is negatively associated with the size of supervisory board and state ownership. The findings have important implications and provide new insights into the subject. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:831 / 846
页数:16
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