Board 3.0: What the Private-Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies

被引:0
作者
Gilson, Ronald J. [1 ,2 ]
Gordon, Jeffrey N. [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTORS; VALUATION;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article makes the case for a new model for public company boards, one that we are calling Board 3.0. Today's dominant public board model, here called Board 2.0, is best understood as the outcome of a now mature organizational experiment that, after its start some 40 years ago, succeeded in replacing a prior organizational form that had fallen short. Board 2.0, which we also refer to as the "monitoring board," is dominated by part-time "independent" directors who are nevertheless heavily dependent on company management for information and are reliant on and influenced by stock market prices as the primary measure of managerial performance.
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页码:43 / 51
页数:9
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