Quality competition and reputation of restaurants: the effects of capacity constraints

被引:18
作者
Chen, You-hua [1 ,2 ]
He, Qinying [1 ,2 ]
Paudel, Krishna P. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] South China Agr Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] South China Agr Univ, Guangdong Ctr Rural Econ Studies, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Louisiana State Univ, Dept Agr Econ & Agribusiness, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
[4] LSU Agr Ctr, Baton Rouge, LA USA
来源
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA | 2018年 / 31卷 / 01期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Capacity constraints; game theory; price-sensitive; quality-sensitive; reputation; FINANCE CONSTRAINTS; DUOPOLY; PRICE; DETERMINANTS; MANAGEMENT; INNOVATION; MERGERS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1080/1331677X.2017.1421996
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Capacity constraints have major effects on restaurant competition. This article captures the impact of capacity constraints on quality and quantity competition of restaurant industry by employing a two-stage asymmetric capacity constraints model. There are several findings from this study. First, results of this study indicate that reputation difference increases total outputs and quality in equilibrium. Second, capacity constraints decrease the consumer surplus (CS) as well as social welfare (SW), but restaurants benefit from capacity constraints sometimes. Third, capacity reduces both the quality and quantity of the competitor. Furthermore, restaurants raise their prices if consumers are quality-sensitive or lower the quality if consumers are price-sensitive under capacity constraints. Fourth, this study compares the total quality, CS, and SW under four cases: no restaurant faces constraints, small restaurant faces constraints, big restaurant faces constraints, and both small and big restaurants face constraints. The total quality investment, CS, and SW are highest if a small restaurant faces capacity constraints while the larger one does not.
引用
收藏
页码:102 / 118
页数:17
相关论文
共 38 条
[1]   Strategic use of forward contracts and capacity constraints [J].
Adilov, Nadir .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2012, 30 (02) :164-173
[2]   Asymmetric capacity constraints and equilibrium price dispersion [J].
Arnold, Michael A. ;
Saliba, Christine .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2011, 111 (02) :158-160
[3]   Product line pricing for services with capacity constraints and dynamic substitution [J].
Burkart, Wolfgang R. ;
Klein, Robert ;
Mayer, Stefan .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2012, 219 (02) :347-359
[4]  
Chen Y, 2016, J SENSORS, V2016, P1, DOI DOI 10.1111/1467-8454.12058
[5]   Agricultural pollution and regulation: How to subsidize agriculture? [J].
Chen, You-hua ;
Wen, Xiao-wei ;
Wang, Bo ;
Nie, Pu-yan .
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2017, 164 :258-264
[6]   ASYMMETRIC DOUPOLY COMPETITION WITH INNOVATION SPILLOVER AND INPUT CONSTRAINTS [J].
Chen, You-hua ;
Nie, Pu-yan ;
Wang, X. Henry .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 2015, 16 (06) :1124-1139
[7]   Duopoly innovation under product externalities [J].
Chen, You-hua ;
Nie, Pu-yan .
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA, 2014, 27 (01) :232-243
[8]   Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints [J].
Chowdhury, Prabal Roy .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2009, 103 (01) :55-58
[9]   The airport problem with capacity constraints [J].
Chun, Youngsub ;
Park, Boram .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2016, 20 (03) :237-253
[10]   Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion [J].
Compte, O ;
Jenny, F ;
Rey, P .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2002, 46 (01) :1-29