Free entry under common ownership

被引：32

作者：

Sato, Susumu ^{[1
]}

Matsumura, Toshihiro ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Hitotsubashi Univ, Inst Econ Res, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 1868603, Japan

[2] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Bunkyo Ku, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo 1130033, Japan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2020年 / 195卷

关键词：

Overlapping ownership; Free entry; Insufficient entry; Excessive entry; Circular markets;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109489

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study investigates the equilibrium and welfare properties of free entry under common ownership. We formulate a model in which incumbents under common ownership choose whether to enter a new market. Using a circular-market model, we find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which may or may not improve welfare. Welfare has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the degree of common ownership, which implies that there is a strictly positive optimal degree of common ownership. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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