Free entry under common ownership

被引：31
|
作者：
Sato, Susumu [1 ]
Matsumura, Toshihiro [2 ]
机构：
[1] Hitotsubashi Univ, Inst Econ Res, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 1868603, Japan
[2] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Bunkyo Ku, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2020年 / 195卷
关键词：
Overlapping ownership; Free entry; Insufficient entry; Excessive entry; Circular markets;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109489
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study investigates the equilibrium and welfare properties of free entry under common ownership. We formulate a model in which incumbents under common ownership choose whether to enter a new market. Using a circular-market model, we find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which may or may not improve welfare. Welfare has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the degree of common ownership, which implies that there is a strictly positive optimal degree of common ownership. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：3
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