Modesty may pay!

被引：54

作者：

Finus, Michael ^{[1
]}

Maus, Stefan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Stirling, Dept Econ, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland

[2] Univ Hagen, Dept Econ, D-58084 Hagen, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 10卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00387.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first-best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.

引用

页码：801 / 826

页数：26

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