Reversal of fortune - Dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth

被引：211

作者：

DeAngelo, H ^{[1
]}

DeAngelo, L ^{[1
]}

Skinner, DJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN, SCH BUSINESS, ANN ARBOR, MI 48109 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 40卷 / 03期

关键词：

dividends; signaling; earnings growth; disclosure policy;

D O I：

10.1016/0304-405X(95)00850-E

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study the signaling content of managers' dividend decisions for 145 NYSE firms whose annual earnings decline after nine or more consecutive years of growth. Using a variety of model specifications and definitions of favorable dividend signals, we find virtually no support for the notion that dividend decisions help identify firms with superior future earnings. Dividends tend not to be reliable signals because (i) a behavioral bias (overoptimism) leads managers to overestimate future earnings when growth prospects fade; and (ii) managers make only modest cash commitments when they increase dividends, undermining the reliability of such signals.

引用

页码：341 / 371

页数：31

共 31 条

[1] QUARTERLY DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND STOCKHOLDERS RETURNS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS [J].