Refounding Law and Economics: Behavioral Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis

被引:4
|
作者
Zamir, Eyal [1 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Fac Law, IL-9190501 Jerusalem, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
agency problem; positive economics; normative economics; behavioral law and economics; bounded ethicality; behavioral ethics; motivational rationality; self-serving biases; motivated reasoning; MORAL DISENGAGEMENT; UNETHICAL ACTIONS; RATIONAL CHOICE; BAD THINGS; SELF; BIAS; PERFORMANCE; ETHICS; COSTS; PERCEPTIONS;
D O I
10.1515/rle-2019-0023
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Based on the premise that people are rational maximizers of their own utility, economic analysis has a fairly successful record in correctly predicting human behavior. This success is puzzling, given behavioral findings that show that people do not necessarily seek to maximize their own utility. Drawing on studies of motivated reasoning, self-serving biases, and behavioral ethics, this article offers a new behavioral foundation for the predictions of economic analysis. The behavioral studies reveal how automatic and mostly unconscious processes lead well-intentioned people to make self-serving decisions. Thus, the behavioral studies support many of the predictions of standard economic analysis, without committing to a simplistic portrayal of human motivation. The article reviews the psychological findings, explains how they provide a sounder, complementary foundation for economic analysis, and discusses their implications for legal policymaking.
引用
收藏
页码:267 / 299
页数:35
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