Corporate governance in banks: impact of board attributes on banks performance

被引:2
作者
Nyuur, Richard B. [1 ]
Ofori, Daniel F. [2 ]
Dedzo, Believe Q. [3 ]
机构
[1] Northumbria Univ, Newcastle Business Sch, City Campus East 1, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 8ST, Tyne & Wear, England
[2] Univ Ghana, Sch Business, Dept Org & Human Resource Management, POB LG 78, Legon, Accra, Ghana
[3] Murdoch Univ, Sch Business & Governance, 90 South St, Murdoch, WA 6150, Australia
关键词
corporate governance; board composition; independent directors; firm performance; Ghana; POLITICALLY CONNECTED BOARDS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; HIGH-GROWTH; DIRECTORS; MECHANISMS; DIVERSITY; COSTS; RISK;
D O I
10.1504/AJAAF.2020.109210
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The study examines the impact of board of directors' composition on firm performance in the Ghanaian banking industry. Using the GMM, fixed and random effect econometric models, the presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) on boards is found to significantly and positively contribute to higher bank performance in terms of return on assets. Board size is also found to have significantly influenced banks performance positively with respect to both return on assets and return on equity, but negatively affects net profit margins of banks. The study further establishes that board members' political attachment has a profound adverse influence on firm performance particularly on net interest margin. These findings provide further insights on the impact of board attributes on firm performance in the banking industry, especially in a developing and under researched context. Research and practical implications are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 41
页数:18
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