Are perks purely managerial excess?

被引：154
作者：
Rajan, RG
Wulf, J
机构：
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[3] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 79卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
perquisites; executive compensation; private benefits;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.01.003
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency-problems-they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm's surplus. Accordingly,. firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, at best, mixed. Perks are, however, offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. While we cannot rule out the occasional aberration, and while we have little to say on the overall level of perks, our findings suggest that treating perks purely as managerial excess is incorrect. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：1 / 33
页数：33
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