Moral Hazard and Corporate Governance

被引：0

作者：

Qin, Changcai ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yantai Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Yantai 264005, Shandong, Peoples R China

来源：

2012 FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING (BIFE) | 2012年

关键词：

separation of two rights; principal-agent problems; corporate governance; moral hazard;

D O I：

10.1109/BIFE.2012.81

中图分类号：

TP39 [计算机的应用];

学科分类号：

081203 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

Separation of modern company's ownership from management determines that the key problem of corporate governance is to solve the interests' conflicts of owner and operator, namely the principal-agent problem. This paper makes analyses of corporate governance mechanism through studying moral hazard problem. There might not be unified mode of corporate governance inside a country of transition economy such as our country. Every company should set up the effective mechanism according to its present stage and characteristics, and there must be one's own characteristics of governance. Meanwhile, we should find the dynamic change of governance mechanism in a view of scientific development.

引用

页码：357 / 359

页数：3