The Loners Will Benefit from the Games

被引：0

作者：

Zhou, Ai-nong ^{[1
]}

Nie, Pu-yan ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Xiao-yan ^{[3
]}

Liu, Lou ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Guangzhou Jinqiao Management Inst, Dept Econ, Guangzhou 510660, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] Jinan Univ, Inst Ind Econ, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China

[3] Guangdong Vocat Coll Mech & Elect Technol, Guangzhou 510515, Peoples R China

[4] Guangdong Univ Business Studies, Sch Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT COMPUTATION TECHNOLOGY AND AUTOMATION, VOL 2, PROCEEDINGS | 2008年

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Nash game; payoff function; game theory; equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1109/ICICTA.2008.124

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

In an economic organization, there exist three strategies for all members: cooperators, defectors and loners and we aim to consider them. By game theory approaches, we compare a loner and a cooperator in an organization. We find that a player will benefit more from the game if he/she is a loiter than he/she is a cooperator under the same conditions. In essence, Nash game is further considered in this paper

引用

页码：781 / 783

页数：3

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