Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions

被引：20

作者：

Decarolis, Francesco ^{[1
,2
]}

Goldmanis, Maris ^{[3
]}

Penta, Antonio ^{[4
,5
,6
,7
]}

机构：

[1] Bocconi Univ, Dept Econ, I-20136 Milan, Italy

[2] Bocconi Univ, Innocetuo Gasparini Inst Econ Res, I-20136 Milan, Italy

[3] Royal Holloway Univ London, Dept Econ, Egham TW20 0EX, Surrey, England

[4] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Catalan Inst Res & Adv Studies, Barcelona 08005, Spain

[5] Barcelona Grad Sch Econ, Barcelona 08005, Spain

[6] Toulouse Sch Econ, F-31015 Toulouse, France

[7] Digital Ctr, F-31015 Toulouse, France

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2020年 / 66卷 / 10期

基金：

欧洲研究理事会;

关键词：

collusion; digital marketing agencies; Facebook; Google; GSP; internet auctions; online advertising; VCG; NASH EQUILIBRIA; BIDDER BEHAVIOR; 2ND-PRICE;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency.

引用

页码：4433 / 4454

页数：22

共 38 条

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