Information provision and willingness to pay irrigation water in Tunisian local associations for agricultural development. An experimental economics study

被引:2
作者
Farolfi, Stefano [1 ,5 ]
Dubois, Dimitri [2 ,5 ]
Morardet, Sylvie [3 ,5 ]
Nouichi, Imen [1 ,4 ]
Marlet, Serge [1 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] CIRAD, UMR G EAU, F-34398 Montpellier, France
[2] CNRS, CEE M, F-34000 Montpellier, France
[3] IRSTEA, UMR G EAU, F-34196 Montpellier, France
[4] INAT, Tunis 1082, Tunisia
[5] Univ Montpellier, F-34090 Montpellier, France
[6] CILSS, Ouagadougou 03, Burkina Faso
来源
CAHIERS AGRICULTURES | 2018年 / 27卷 / 02期
关键词
information; experimental economics; water; irrigation; Tunisia; PUBLIC-GOODS; COLLECTIVE ACTION; FIELD EXPERIMENTS; COMMONS; GAME;
D O I
10.1051/cagri/2018007
中图分类号
S [农业科学];
学科分类号
09 ;
摘要
Irrigation water is a crucial resource for economic and social development in Tunisia. In a context of decentralization and State devolution, the local associations for agricultural development or 'Groupements de Developpement Agricole (GDA)' manage today a large share of irrigation water in the country. However, these institutions are experiencing a lack of acknowledgment by water users, resulting in a low willingness to pay (WTP) for water. In this article, we study to what extent information provided to users on the functioning of the system (<< institutional >> information) and/or on the decisions taken by other users (<< social >> information) can affect their WTP. Our analysis is twofold. A field survey first revealed the farmers' demand for better information provision. A laboratory experiment allowed then to isolate the impact of the two types of information on subjects' decisions through a game with similar properties to those observed in the field. Data collected in the lab confirm the existence of a causality relation between information provided to users and their WTP for a common resource such as irrigation water.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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