A note on the seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information

被引：17

作者：

Yilankaya, O ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 87卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1999.2532

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. some seller types may obtain higher expected payoffs in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, contrary to popular belief. It. one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

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页码：267 / 271

页数：5

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