Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism

被引：168
作者：
Pathak, Parag A. [1 ]
Sonmez, Tayfun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Soc Fellows, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2008年 / 98卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1257/aer.98.4.1636
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：1636 / 1652
页数：17
相关论文
共 15 条
[1]   School choice:: A mechanism design approach [J].
Abdulkadiroglu, A ;
Sönmez, T .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2003, 93 (03) :729-747
[2]   A tale of two mechanisms:: Student placement [J].
Balinski, M ;
Sönmez, T .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 84 (01) :73-94
[3]   School choice:: an experimental study [J].
Chen, Y ;
Sönmez, T .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2006, 127 (01) :202-231
[4]  
Chubb J., 1990, POLITICS MARKETS AME
[5]   MACHIAVELLI AND THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM [J].
DUBINS, LE ;
FREEDMAN, DA .
AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1981, 88 (07) :485-494
[6]   Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism [J].
Ergin, H ;
Sönmez, T .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2006, 90 (1-2) :215-237
[7]   COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J].
GALE, D ;
SHAPLEY, LS .
AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) :9-&
[8]   JOB MATCHING, COALITION-FORMATION, AND GROSS SUBSTITUTES [J].
KELSO, AS ;
CRAWFORD, VP .
ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) :1483-1504
[9]  
Knuth D, 1976, MARRIAGES STABLES
[10]  
KOJIMA F, SOCIAL CHOI IN PRESS
12