Homophily, networks, and critical mass: Solving the start-up problem in large group collective action

被引:93
作者
Centola, Damon M. [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT Sloan Sch, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
Collective action; critical mass; large group problem; social networks; homophily; GROUP HETEROGENEITY; GROUP-SIZE; DYNAMICS; COOPERATION; MODELS; PROTEST; SPREAD; NORMS;
D O I
10.1177/1043463112473734
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
Formal theories of collective action face the problem that in large groups a single actor makes such a small impact on the collective good that cooperation is irrational. Critical mass theorists argue that this 'large group problem' can be solved by an initial critical mass of contributors, whose efforts can produce a 'bandwagon' effect, making cooperation rational for the remaining members of the population. However, critical mass theory requires an explanation of how a critical mass can form in the first place. I present a model of collective action that solves this problem by showing how aspects of social structure - including network topology, homophily, and local coalition formation - can allow rational actors to endogenously form a critical mass. The findings indicate that as the mobilization effort becomes more 'complex', clustered networks and homophily become increasingly important for critical mass collective action.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 40
页数:38
相关论文
共 66 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1991, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement
[2]  
[Anonymous], RES SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1999, Small Worlds. The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1978, Micromotives and Macrobehavior
[5]   COOPERATION AND GROUP-SIZE IN N-PERSON PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].
BONACICH, P ;
SHURE, GH ;
KAHAN, JP ;
MEEKER, RJ .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1976, 20 (04) :687-706
[6]   Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population [J].
Boyd, R ;
Richerson, PJ .
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 2002, 215 (03) :287-296
[7]   AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF CLUBS [J].
BUCHANAN, JM .
ECONOMICA, 1965, 32 (125) :1-14
[8]   The emperor's dilemma: A computational model of self-enforcing norms [J].
Centola, D ;
Willer, R ;
Macy, M .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 2005, 110 (04) :1009-1040
[9]   Complex contagions and the weakness of long ties [J].
Centola, Damon ;
Macy, Michael .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 2007, 113 (03) :702-734
[10]   Cascade dynamics of complex propagation [J].
Centola, Damon ;
Eguiluz, Victor M. ;
Macy, Michael W. .
PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2007, 374 (01) :449-456