Private benefits of control: An international comparison

被引:1266
作者
Dyck, A [1 ]
Zingales, L
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as -4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra-legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors.
引用
收藏
页码:537 / 600
页数:64
相关论文
共 56 条
[1]   AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING [J].
AGHION, P ;
BOLTON, P .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (03) :473-494
[2]  
[Anonymous], RIGHT TELL ROLE MASS
[3]   PRIVATE BENEFITS FROM CONTROL OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS [J].
BARCLAY, MJ ;
HOLDERNESS, CG .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 25 (02) :371-395
[4]  
BEBCHUK L, 1999, WORKING PAPER NBER, V7203
[5]   Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealth [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Jolls, C .
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 1999, 15 (02) :487-502
[6]   Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders [J].
Burkart, M ;
Gromb, D ;
Panunzi, F .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (01) :172-204
[7]  
Coffee JC, 1999, NORTHWEST U LAW REV, V93, P641
[8]  
COFFEE JC, 2001, UNPUB DO NORMS MATTE
[9]   MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP OF VOTING-RIGHTS - A STUDY OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS WITH DUAL CLASSES OF COMMON-STOCK [J].
DEANGELO, H ;
DEANGELO, L .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 14 (01) :33-69
[10]   THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP - CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES [J].
DEMSETZ, H ;
LEHN, K .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (06) :1155-1177