Pre-empting technology competition through firm acquisitions

被引：46

作者：

Grimpe, Christoph ^{[2
,3
]}

Hussinger, Katrin ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maastricht, Maastricht, Netherlands

[2] ZEW, Mannheim, Germany

[3] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Louvain, Belgium

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 100卷 / 02期

关键词：

pre-empting technology competition; mergers and acquisitions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2008.01.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that firms engage in horizontal mergers and acquisitions to pre-empt competition in technology markets. Making use of the patent application procedure at the European Patent Office we introduce a measure for potential entry barriers in technology markets. (C) 2008 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：189 / 191

页数：3

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