Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

被引：23

作者：

Kamijo, Y. ^{[1
]}

Nihonsugi, T. ^{[2
]}

Takeuchi, A. ^{[3
]}

Funaki, Y. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Kochi Univ Technol, Dept Management, Komi, Kochi 7828502, Japan

[2] Gifu Shotoku Gakuen Univ, Fac Econ & Informat, Gifu, Gifu 5008288, Japan

[3] Ritsumeikan Univ, Coll Econ, Kusatsu, Shiga 5258577, Japan

[4] Waseda Univ, Sch Polit Sci & Econ, Tokyo 1698050, Japan

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2014年 / 84卷

关键词：

Linear public goods game; Sanction; Punishment institutions; Laboratory experiment; PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; TAX EVASION; ENFORCEMENT; PROVISION; FEEDBACK; BEHAVIOR; CRIME; LEGAL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：180 / 195

页数：16

共 32 条

[1] Audit certainty audit productivity, and taxpayer compliance [J].