What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

被引:14
作者
Lehrer, Ehud [1 ]
Rosenberg, Dinah
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Math Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Univ Paris 13, LAGA Inst Galilee, F-93430 Villetaneuse, France
[3] Ecole Polytech, Lab Econometr, F-75230 Paris, France
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
Bayesian games; information structure; symmetric information; one-sided information; value-of-information function;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.09.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:343 / 357
页数:15
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