Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy

被引：7

作者：

Krebs, Tom ^{[1
]}

Kuhn, Moritz ^{[2
]}

Wright, Mark L. J. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68313 Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[3] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL 60604 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2015年 / 105卷 / 11期

关键词：

LIFE-INSURANCE; CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY; CREDIT; DYNAMICS; CONSTRAINTS; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; BANKRUPTCY; MARKETS; US;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20111681

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings, and consumption inequality. The model also predicts that reforms making consumer bankruptcy more costly will substantially increase the volume of both credit and insurance.

引用

页码：3223 / 3272

页数：50

共 59 条

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