Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay

被引:399
作者
Custodio, Claudia [1 ]
Ferreira, Miguel A. [2 ]
Matos, Pedro [3 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Dept Finance, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[2] Nova Sch Business & Econ, Lisbon, Portugal
[3] Univ Virginia, Darden Sch Business, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
关键词
Executive compensation; Market for executives; Human capital; CEO INCENTIVES; COMPENSATION; MARKET; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; COMPETITION; INEQUALITY; INVESTMENT; INDUSTRY; POLICIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We show that pay is higher for chief executive officers (CEOs) with general managerial skills gathered during lifetime work experience. We use CEOs' resumes of Standard and Poor's 1,500 firms from 1993 through 2007 to construct an index of general skills that are transferable across firms and industries. We estimate an annual pay premium for generalist CEOs (those with an index value above the median) of 19% relative to specialist CEOs, which represents nearly a million dollars per year. This relation is robust to the inclusion of firm- and CEO-level controls, including fixed effects. CEO pay increases the most when firms externally hire a new CEO and switch from a specialist to a generalist CEO. Furthermore, the pay premium is higher when CEOs are hired to perform complex tasks such as restructurings and acquisitions. Our findings provide direct evidence of the increased importance of general managerial skills over firm-specific human capital in the market for CEOs in the last decades. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:471 / 492
页数:22
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