Does mixed-ownership reform restrain stock price synchronicity? Evidence from China

被引：15

作者：

Wang, Wei ^{[1
,5
]}

Cheng, Sijia ^{[2
]}

Nahar, Shamsun ^{[3
]}

Alhaleh, Shadi Emad Areef ^{[4
]}

Wang, Hua ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Guangxi Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Guilin, Peoples R China

[2] Guangxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting & Auditing, Nanning, Peoples R China

[3] Jagannath Univ, Dept Accounting & Informat Syst, Dhaka, Bangladesh

[4] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan, Peoples R China

[5] 15 Yucai Rd, Guilin 541004, Guangxi, Peoples R China

来源：

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY | 2022年 / 73卷

关键词：

State-owned enterprise; Mixed-ownership; Reform; Stock price synchronicity; China; TUNNELING EVIDENCE; INFORMATION; ANALYSTS; FIRM; MARKETS; TRANSPARENCY; INNOVATION; INDUSTRY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.eap.2021.11.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the relation between the mixed-ownership reform and the degree of stock price synchronicity by using a sample of 1211 listed State Owned Enterprise (SOE) for the period of 2003-2018 in China. Through empirical assessment, we reveal robust evidence that the higher intensity of the mixed-ownership, the lower degree of SOE stock price synchronicity. Based on path analysis, we verified the negative correlation between the mixed-ownership intensity and the stock price synchronicity via two paths, namely information transparency and analyst coverage augmentation. Our additional analysis established that the negative association between the mixed-ownership intensity and stock price synchronicity is strongly influenced by the decentralization of local governments. Specifically, the stronger degree of decentralized regional governments, the more significant their negative effect. (C) 2021 Economic Society of Australia, Queensland. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：390 / 404

页数：15

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