Broadcast control channel jamming: Resilience and identification of traitors

被引:19
作者
Chan, Agnes [1 ]
Liu, Xin [1 ]
Noubir, Guevara [1 ]
Thapa, Bishal [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Coll Comp & Informat Sci, Boston, MA 02115 USA
来源
2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION THEORY PROCEEDINGS, VOLS 1-7 | 2007年
关键词
D O I
10.1109/ISIT.2007.4557594
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In this paper, we address the problem of countering jamming of broadcast control channels in wireless communication systems. Targeting control traffic on a system, e.g., BCCH channel in GSM, leads to smart attacks that can be four orders of magnitude more efficient than blind jamming. We propose several schemes based on coding theory and its applications that can counter both external and internal attackers (traitors). We introduce a T-(traitor) resilient scheme that requires less than (Tlog(T) N)(2) control information transmissions and guarantees delivery of control information against any coalition of T traitors. The proposed scheme also allows the identification of persistently jamming traitors.
引用
收藏
页码:2496 / 2500
页数:5
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