Voter ignorance and the democratic ideal

被引:110
作者
Somin, I [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Yale Univ, Sch Law, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1080/08913819808443511
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
If voters do not understand the programs of rival candidates or their likely consequences, they cannot rationally exercise control over government. An ignorant electorate cannot achieve true democratic control over public policy. The immense size and scope of modern government makes it virtually impossible for voters to acquire sufficient knowledge to exercise such control. The problem is exacerbated by voters' strong incentive to be "rationally ignorant" of politics. This danger to democracy cannot readily be circumvented through "shortcut" methods of economizing on voter knowledge costs. A truly democratic government must, therefore, be strictly limited in scope.
引用
收藏
页码:413 / 458
页数:46
相关论文
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