Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining

被引:10
作者
Acharya, Avidit [1 ]
Ortner, Juan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, W Allen Wallis Inst Polit Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
Bargaining; Multiple issues; Partial agreements; Delay; Inefficiency; PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; AGENDA RESTRICTIONS; STOCHASTIC-MODEL; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show that players may consume only a fraction of the existing pie in the first period, and then consume the remainder of it, along with the second pie, at the date at which the second pie becomes available Thus, our model features a special form of bargaining delay, in which agreements take place in multiple stages. Such partial agreements arise when players are patient enough, when they expect the second pie to become available soon, and when the asymmetry in their valuations is large enough. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2150 / 2163
页数:14
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