Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes

被引:154
作者
Dohmen, Thomas [1 ]
Falk, Armin [2 ]
Huffman, David [3 ]
Sunde, Uwe [4 ]
机构
[1] Maastricht Univ, Inst Study Labor, IZA, Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Univ Bonn, IZA, CEPR, D-5300 Bonn, Germany
[3] Swarthmore Coll, Swarthmore, PA 19081 USA
[4] Univ St Gallen, IZA, CEPR, St Gallen, Switzerland
关键词
FAIRNESS; CONTRACTS; TRUST;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02242.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article complements the experimental literature that has shown the importance of reciprocity for behaviour in stylised labour markets or other decision settings. We use individual measures of reciprocal inclinations in a large, representative survey and relate reciprocity to real world labour market behaviour and life outcomes. We find that reciprocity matters and that the way in which it matters is very much in line with the experimental evidence. In particular, positive reciprocity is associated with receiving higher wages and working harder. Negatively reciprocal inclinations tend to reduce effort. Negative reciprocity increases the likelihood of being unemployed.
引用
收藏
页码:592 / 612
页数:21
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