Lorenz Equilibrium: Equitability in non-Cooperative Games

被引：3

作者：

Nagy, Reka ^{[1
]}

Suciu, Mihai ^{[1
]}

Dumitrescu, D. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Babes Bolyai, R-3400 Cluj Napoca, Romania

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENETIC AND EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION CONFERENCE | 2012年

关键词：

Games; Equilibrium; Lorenz dominance; Multiple Nash Equilibrium; DIFFERENTIAL EVOLUTION; OPTIMIZATION; CRITERIA;

D O I：

10.1145/2330163.2330233

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

The most popular solution concept in game theory, Nash equilibrium, has some limitations when applied to real life problems. Nash equilibrium rarely assures maximal payoff. A possibility is to consider Pareto equilibrium, inspired from the standard solution concept in multi-criteria optimization, but the obtained equilibria often consists of a large set of solutions that is too hard to process. Our aim is to find an equilibrium concept that provides a small set of efficient solutions, equitable for all players. The Lorenz dominance relation is investigated in this respect. A crowding based differential evolution method is proposed for detecting the Lorenz-optimal solutions. Based on the Lorenz dominance relation, the Lorenz equilibrium for non-cooperative games is proposed. The Lorenz equilibrium consists of those Pareto-optimal solutions that are the most balanced and equitable solutions for all players. We propose to use Lorenz equilibrium for selecting one Nash equilibrium for games having several Nash equilibria.

引用

页码：489 / 496

页数：8

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