A characterization of cooperation in dynamic network games

被引：0

作者：

Koch, Caleb M. ^{[1
]}

Rossier, Alain ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Computat Social Sci, Zurich, Switzerland

[2] Dept Math, Zurich, Switzerland

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTATION (NETECON '19) | 2019年

关键词：

Networks; dynamic games; exchange economies; equilibrium refinement; stability; collusiveness; Pareto dominance; COALITION-FORMATION; EQUILIBRIUM; STABILITY;

D O I：

10.1145/3338506.3340236

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

This paper explores conditions under which players cooperate in a dynamic network game. Historically, folk theorems have provided a speckled perspective by showing that there exists equilibria where players cooperate, do not cooperate, as well as a myriad of equilibria between these extremes. Our main contribution is identifying a necessary and sufficient equilibrium refinement such that, for all equilibria, all players cooperate in order to reach a strictly Pareto dominant graph. We base our results on a class of games that subsume forward-looking extensions of exchange economies with indivisible goods.

引用

页数：6

共 27 条

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