CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation

被引：28

作者：

Page, T. Beau ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, Goldring Woldenbeig Hall 7 McAlister Dr, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 128卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO compensation; Dynamic principal-agent model; Structural estimation; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; MORAL HAZARD; PERFORMANCE-MEASURES; STOCK-OPTIONS; RISK-AVERSION; INCENTIVES; PAY; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：378 / 401

页数：24

共 70 条

[1] The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].